query that database would take protective action at the beginning of each
session. Specifically, they would begin each session by
setting <varname>search_path</varname> to the empty string or otherwise
- removing non-superuser-writable schemas
+ removing schemas that are writable by non-superusers
from <varname>search_path</varname>. There are a few usage patterns
easily supported by the default configuration:
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
- <!-- "DROP SCHEMA public" is inferior to this REVOKE, because pg_dump
- doesn't preserve that DROP.
-
- A database owner can attack the database's users via "CREATE SCHEMA
+ <para>
+ Constrain ordinary users to user-private schemas.
+ To implement this pattern, first ensure that no schemas have
+ public <literal>CREATE</literal> privileges. Then, for every user
+ needing to create non-temporary objects, create a schema with the
+ same name as that user, for example
+ <literal>CREATE SCHEMA alice AUTHORIZATION alice</literal>.
+ (Recall that the default search path starts
+ with <literal>$user</literal>, which resolves to the user
+ name. Therefore, if each user has a separate schema, they access
+ their own schemas by default.) This pattern is a secure schema
+ usage pattern unless an untrusted user is the database owner or
+ holds the <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> privilege, in which case no
+ secure schema usage pattern exists.
+ </para>
+ <!-- A database owner can attack the database's users via "CREATE SCHEMA
trojan; ALTER DATABASE $mydb SET search_path = trojan, public;". A
CREATEROLE user can issue "GRANT $dbowner TO $me" and then use the
database owner attack. -->
+
<para>
- Constrain ordinary users to user-private schemas. To implement this,
- first issue <literal>REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM
- PUBLIC</literal>. Then, for every user needing to create non-temporary
- objects, create a schema with the same name as that user. Recall that
- the default search path starts with <literal>$user</literal>, which
- resolves to the user name. Therefore, if each user has a separate
- schema, they access their own schemas by default. After adopting this
- pattern in a database where untrusted users had already logged in,
- consider auditing the public schema for objects named like objects in
- schema <literal>pg_catalog</literal>. This pattern is a secure schema
- usage pattern unless an untrusted user is the database owner or holds
- the <literal>CREATEROLE</literal> privilege, in which case no secure
- schema usage pattern exists.
- </para>
- <para>
- If the database originated in an upgrade
- from <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> 14 or earlier,
- the <literal>REVOKE</literal> is essential. Otherwise, the default
- configuration follows this pattern; ordinary users can create only
- temporary objects until a privileged user furnishes a schema.
+ In <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> 15 and later, the default
+ configuration supports this usage pattern. In prior versions, or
+ when using a database that has been upgraded from a prior version,
+ you will need to remove the public <literal>CREATE</literal>
+ privilege from the <literal>public</literal> schema (issue
+ <literal>REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM PUBLIC</literal>).
+ Then consider auditing the <literal>public</literal> schema for
+ objects named like objects in schema <literal>pg_catalog</literal>.
</para>
+ <!-- "DROP SCHEMA public" is inferior to this REVOKE, because pg_dump
+ doesn't preserve that DROP. -->
</listitem>
<listitem>